Of a ll the spymasters who have ever practiced the art, few have started as an auto mechanic and embalmer, but Donald Nichols did both and was able to parlay his latent talents into his own postwar Korean spy organization, complete with his own base, secret army, and rules. T he fascinating but profoundly disturbing story of how he did that is the theme of Bla ine Harden's new book, King of
Spies.
Nichols did not have the most auspicious start as an intelligence star. Rai sed in poverty, with a loose-li ving mother who left him and his siblings at an early age, he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. His salvation appeared in the form of the military-in the spring of 1940 he joined the Army and received orders fo r Karachi, British India. He wou ld serve in the region throughout WW I I. In this environment Nichols learned a foundational lesson-" lfyou make the bosses happy, they won' t question your methods." (2 1)
In 1947, Nichols transferred to the US Air Force and received orders for Korea, an undesirable assignment for most airmen but a godsend to Nichols, given his dysfunctional life at home. He arrived in Seoul in late June 1946 in the midst o f a bloody civi l war between the anti-Commu nist government of strongman President Syngman Rhee a nd anti-government forces inspired by the young, charismatic, popular leader of North Korea, Kim II-Sung. Although anti-US feeli ngs in South Korea were rampant, where others saw c haos, N icho ls saw an opportunity to conduct "positive intelligence," i.e., infiltrating leftist organizations and sending agents behind enemy lines to find targets and recruit informers.
In his new-found venture, he had a powerful natura l ally-Preside nt Rhee-with whom he had a " father-son" relationship. The 7 1-year-old Rhee apparently first met the 23-year-old Nichols in 1946, and each was suitably impressed with the other. More than that, each needed the othe r-the in formation that Nichols provided to Rhee via his agents would help the president stay in power, and the patronage that Nichols received from Rhee would make him a celebrity and key power broker in South Korea.
In the meantime, Nichols continued to bui ld his intelligence empire and satisfy his customers, w ho rewarded him w ith unrestricted fu nding, equipment, and promotions. From Army master sergeant he was quick ly promoted in the Air Force to chief warrant officer, then to lieutenant, captai n, and finally major. By 1949, the then low-rank ing US Air Force NCO had amazi ngly become the chief a ir advisor to a fore ign head of state-Rhee. That same year, the last US troops left Korea, and Nicho ls and his six agents who remained became part of the Korean Military Adv isory Group, or KMAG.
Also in 1949, Nichols met the one man most responsible for the longevity of his Air Force career-the Fifth Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. Earle Partridge, who saw much of his past self in the portly, undisciplined non-conformist. As Harden notes, throughout his career a nd life, Nichols had the disarming abil ity to befriend o lder, powerful men such as Partridge, who went lo great lengths to defend, reward, and keep hi m happy. When Nichols managed to make what Harden refers to as " an exceptionally powerful e nemy" in the person of Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur's chief inte lli gence o fficer, Ambassador Muccio-for w hom KMAG workeddefended Nichols, and Partridge kept Nichols under the she lter of hi s wi ng fo r years to come.
Nichols quickly gained some measure of inte lligence fame for providing US authoriti es with the projected date of the North Korean invasion of the South, w hich occurred on 25 June 1950. As Harden notes, however, Nichols's report has never surfaced, and the author posits that it might have been imaginary, as Nicho ls had a lifelong history of making things up, according to fam ily and friends-a trait that would eventua lly unde rmine his career. Nonetheless, a jealous rather than vengeful Wi lloughby the n tried to hire Nichols away, as did CIA, but Partridge and the A ir Force continued to pamper and All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. Vol 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018) protect their golden boy from the enticements of ri val suitors.
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I-le also proved his worth by feeding bombing targets to the Fifth Air Force, using his network of agents to glean relevant in formation. In grateful appreciation, Tokyo-based Far East A ir Forces commander Gen. George Stratemeyer promoted N it:hols, then a lieutenant, to captain. President Rhee, meanwhile, had taken advantage of the invasion to slaughter tens of thousands of South Korean communists in a brutal example of politica l c leansing that rema ined largely unknown for 50 years. Nichols, an eyewitness to the largest such massacre, near Taejon, said nothing about it until he w rote his autobiography 3 1 years later, and even then he purposely changed the venue to disguise his peripheral involvement.
N ichols expanded his operations to include codebreaking after he obtained a North Korean People's Army codebook from a North Korean defector. N ichols set up a unit to monitor the unchanged codes and had the translated intercepts immediately delivered to Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force headquarters, both then in Taegu, by jeep-the gold standard in providing intelligence support to the battlefield. Such actions caused observers to dub him " the King of Codebreaking," although such inside information did not enabl e him to foresee the Chinese invasion of Korea in November 1950; as Harden points out, MacArthur and Willoughby were all equally in the dark.
In early 195 1, M aj. Gen. Partridge proposed to his boss, Gen. Stratemeyer, the creation of a special unit for N ichols and his men, the innocuous-sounding Special Activities U nit # I , changed four months later to the even murk ier Detachment 2 o f the 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS), w hich became much better-known in theater as " Nick's outfit," or just "N ICK." As Harden w rites, "N ichols was given open-ended authority to gather intel ligence, conduct sabotage, demolition, and guerrilla operations behind enemy lines." (99-100) By late 1952, N ichols control led a vast empire. N !CK consisted of 50 sub-detachments and 52 A ir Force personnel and 900 Korean agents and fighters reported to him personally. His personal salvaging of a then-revolutionary T-34 tank and the daring recovery of two downed MiG-15 j et fighters (though South Korean eyew itnesses downplayed his role in both), combined w ith his extension in Korea, prompted his promotion to major in late 195 1. The official US Air Force history of the Korean War descri bed him as " the most important single collector of air intelligence for tactical bombing of North Korea." ( 121) But, although it was not yet obvious, Nichols's career-as well as his li fe-had peaked by age 30.
Nicholas would earn one more positive fitness report, including a promotion recommendation in 1956, before he would be engulfed in accusations of fraud, mishandling of official funds, " irregularities" in the handling of sources, homosexuality, and pedophilia. Eventually diagnosed as schizophrenic, he was in and out of psychiatric care, he was medical ly discharged in 1962. He continued to be accused again of sexual misconduct, including the rape of a teenaged girl, but he managed to stay out ofjai l, meeting his end under psychiatri c care in a VA hospital in 1992.
King of Spies is a well-written page-turner, as one would expect given such a colorful, outrageous life as that of Donald Nichols. Much to the chagrin of historians, j ournalists often write more readab le books, and Harden, a past Washington Post bureau chief and author, is no exception. The map and selected photographs are we lcome aids to the reader, and the story is an important and neglected one that needs to be told frankly.
By the same token, readers need to be aware of comments the author makes in the book that raise eyebrows i f not hack les. For example, he describes the MiG-I 5 as "blazingly fast" (98), which leads the reader to bel ieve that it completely outclassed the F-86 Sabre Jet, yet the maximum speeds of the two fighters are only one mileper-hour apart. Perhaps more disturbing is Harden's thinly-disguised role as North Korean apologist, arguing that it is activity such as Nichols's that explains why K im Jong-Un so intensely hates the U nited States today, a specious conc lusion that warps historical perspective to express a political opinion. The most compe lling lesson that readers should take away from this story is that, despite his intelligence accompl ishments, Nichols was an aberration, not even remotely the norm. Finally, being a consum mate spy master does not necessari ly make one a "king of spies," and even a cursory reading of intelligence history will suggest other individuals more deserving of the book's title.
In a sense, reading King <~/Spies is like getting an inoculation-the experience is going to hurt initial ly but ultimately w ill be beneficial.
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